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CONGRESSIONAL QUANDARY:
INCREASING THE ARMY RESERVE FULL-TIME SUPPORT FORCE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The full-time support (FTS) force, consisting of Active Guard Reserve soldiers, Army Reserve technicians, Department of the Army civilians, and Active Component soldiers in support of the Army Reserve, enhances the reserve unit's administrative, recruiting, planning, maintenance, supply and training functions essential to unit readiness. FTS personnel serve as "force multiplier," enabling drilling reservists to take maximum advantage of limited training time. Since the Army Reserve FTS force is the smallest of all the Reserve Components, Congress decided that the Army Reserve FTS force should increase to 14 percent of the Selected Reserve's end-strength. But how will the Army Reserve ever achieve this growth objective if Congress is unwilling to authorize funding to increase the force? This individual study project addresses this fundamental question and recommends that Congress approve a FTS manning increase with appropriate funding for the next three years. Then the Army Reserve can continue to improve its readiness to mobilize.

Keywords: military, Vietnam war, Gulf War, Vietnam War, Vietnam War

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CONGRESSIONAL QUANDARY:
INCREASING THE ARMY RESERVE FULL-TIME SUPPORT FORCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Does the United States Army Reserve (USAR) Full Time Support Force (FTS) provide adequate readiness support for the USAR? If this is the case, should Congress continue to authorize the increase of the force?

This study will establish the importance of the USAR as a part of the Total Army and provide a strong justification for the FTS force to assist in the preparedness of the Troop Program Units (TPU) for mobilization or call-up.

BACKGROUND

Why is the question of increasing the FTS force so important to the success in readiness of the Army Reserve? One must look back into the past and try to understand how vital the Army Reserve is to the overall National Defense.

On 1 March 1923, General Pershing, Army Chief of Staff, directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to study the question of:

Establishing an agency in the War Department whose express function will be to handle questions pertaining to the Reserves, that is, an agency to which Reserve officers seeking information or with recommendations to make, or any business relating to the Reserves could go and receive a cordial welcome and thoughtful consideration. I think no such agency now exists in the department. 1

Subsequently, a Reserve Officers' section was established on June 12, 1923, under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But the office did not sufficiently serve the Reserve Officers' Corps, so in March 1927, the position was transferred to the

Army Chief of Staff office and designated "Executive for Reserve Affairs." But only ten days later, the position was suspended. Only in September 1936 was the position realigned, allowing the Reserve Executive to report directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff. ² On 16 April 1941, the title of the office was changed to "Office of the Executive for Reserve and Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Affairs," a title that was used until 1954. ³

In their book, Twice the Citizen, Crossland and Currie offer a good summary of the Reserve's role between the World Wars:

The head of the Reserve office during the inter-war period had no direct authority over anyone except his own clerk. Brigadier General Palmer, whose position was purely unofficial, had described his role as "solely... advisory," and this was the pattern for the men who were later given the title of "Reserve Executive." In 1936, for example, Brigadier General E.S. Hartshorn informed an investigator for the Civil Service Commission, that "the Chief of Staff retains to himself the supervision and control of the Reserve Component of the Army of the United States. The Executive for Reserves Affairs is the assistant to the Chief of Staff and his immediate adviser in all matters relating to the administration of the Reserve Component. It is the duty of the Executive for Reserve Affairs to maintain contact with the personnel of the Officers' Reserve Corps and, speaking for the Chief of Staff, to render decisions upon such matters as are delegated to him by the Chief of Staff. All instructions issued by the Office of the Executive for Reserve Affairs are given in the name of the Chief of Staff." ⁴

So finally the position had some authority, especially with the authorization of a general officer primarily to handle reserve affairs on a full-time basis. General Pershing's charge for creating a Reserve Affairs office had finally been realized. ⁵

ENDNOTES

1. John J. Pershing, General, Army Chief of Staff, Memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff, March 1, 1923.
2. Richard B. Crossland, LTC, USAR and James T. Currie, MAJ, USAR, Twice the Citizen, pp. 35-36.
3. Ibid., p. 36.
4. Ibid., p. 37.
5. Ibid., p. 37.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY

WORLD WAR II

Between World War I and II, the United States intended to maintain a small regular Army with a large reserve force. Despite this intention, the country was not prepared to support even a modest level of military activity. ¹

On September 1, 1939, Hitler's Army invaded Poland. At that point, President Roosevelt authorized a 17,000-man increase to the regular Army. As the German Army continued with their invasions of Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, the public and Congressional opinion in the United States shifted decisively to defense preparedness. ²

War Department planners soon began to realize that there might be a mobilization without a M-day. The regular Army was gradually expanded, and on August 27, 1940, Congress authorized calling the Organized Reserve (officers and enlisted men) and the National Guard to active Federal service for a period of twelve months. ³

On 16 September 1940, Congress passed the first peace-time conscription; shortly thereafter, large numbers of draftees were entering the Army. ⁴ In their study of military mobilization, Kreidberg and Henry noted that "The immediate need for large numbers of additional officers was filled by extending the active duty tours of capable Reserve officers already in the service and by calling still more Reserve

officers to active duty. ⁵ In June 1940, there had been 2,710 Reserve officers on active duty whereas by May 1941, there were more than 46,000. ⁶

As Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall reported in 1941:

The procurement of suitable officer personnel was fortunately solved by the fact that during the lean, post-war years over 100,000 Reserve officers had been continuously trained... These Reserve officers constituted the principal available asset which we possessed at this time. Without their assistance the program could not have been carried out except in a superficial manner, as is evidenced by the fact that today they (Reserve officers) constitute 75% to 90% of the officer strength with Regular Army units. ⁷

The Reserve officers served well during the war, providing a large percentage of our officers. Since little emphasis was placed on preparing Organized Reserve units prior to the war, most of the units were mobilized in name only.

After World War II, the country moved from a war-time to a peace-time economy. But a policy to maintain a strong reserve force was promulgated. War Department planners could not afford to repeat the post-World War I experience of not preparing the Reserve Component (RC). Military leaders felt there was need for a strong reserve force to supplement the active Army.

KOREAN CONFLICT

Despite the grandiose plans of the Defense Department planners, the RC did not achieve their strength objectives. The Organized Reserve Corps' (ORC) readiness was questionable.

In fact, when the North Koreans invaded their southern neighbors in 1950, the Reserves were not ready to mobilize and fight in the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that:

The outbreak of the war was to reveal that these forces were suffering from severe defects, largely stemming from the Administration's efforts to hold military expenditures to a minimum. President Truman had laid down his economy objective in 1948, and had held to it in the preparation of the budgets for fiscal years 1950 and 1951. Its effect was to force the services to abandon the plans they had drawn, following the hasty and ill-considered demobilization at the end of World War II, to expand their forces to levels judged necessary for the 'cold war.' Thus the Army, which in 1947 had set a goal of 25 divisions, had cut this back to 10 and maintained the lower figure only with some difficulty. ⁸

On 25 June 1950, the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel. Again, the Americans were not ready to resist because of years of neglect of the Army. The only recourse was for President Truman to obtain Congressional authorization to mobilize the Organized Reserve Corps and National Guard to active federal service. ⁹

Subsequently, 7,862 captains and lieutenants from the ORC were the first to be called to active duty. However, these officers were not assigned to individual units. Within three months of the North Korean assault on South Korea, 404 ORC units including 10,584 individual Reserve officers had been federalized. In contrast to World War II, the Defense Department ensured ORC unit integrity by mobilizing intact units. As much as possible, reservists were called to active duty with their units. This strategy served to ensure coherence of ORC units in case of a more major war elsewhere. ¹⁰

By the end of the first full year of fighting in Korea, more than 200,000 members of the ORC and 95,000 National Guardsmen had been called to duty. During this same period, the Army received 550,000 draftees and 175,000 volunteers. 11

Only a fraction of the ORC was ordered to active service; even reservists not called up endured some hardship. Permanent employment became difficult because of the uncertainty of the reservist being ordered to active duty. In October 1950, Rear Admiral I.M. McQuiston, a member of the Secretary of Defense's Civilian Components Policy Board, stated:

There is evidence of serious deterioration in the morale of reservists--a deterioration that is progressive and is expanding at an alarming rate. Indications are prevalent that a growing attitude in their intent to resign their commissions or terminate their enlisted status at the first opportunity. This is not because of any unwillingness to serve their country in time of war, but because the reservists finds himself unduly penalized in time of limited mobilization. 12

Because of lessons learned from the Korean conflict's mobilization, Congress revitalized the Reserves through the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. Public Law 82-476 defined the responsibilities, position and regulation for the Reserves. Further, each of the seven Reserve Components would have a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve. The ORC was then renamed the "Army Reserve." Importantly, a ceiling of 1,500,000 reservists was established for the Ready Reserve, and safeguards allowed Congress or the President in case of national emergency or war to mobilize the Ready Reserve. Another important provision of the Act created a Reserve Forces Policy Board of 18 members reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. 13

Crossland and Currie offered an incisive concluding observation about the Korean experience:

The Korean War Armistice was signed in July 1953, just six months after Dwight D. Eisenhower had assumed the Presidency. Korea was over, though the country remained divided. Its legacy, however, would be an important one. The most comprehensive Congressional history of the reserve forces of the United States concluded that the Korean War had caught the Department of Defense largely unprepared. Indeed, the belated efforts to strengthen the Army's Reserve Components that began in 1948 had barely begun to show results two years later. The extreme frugality of the post-World War II period--a historically typical US reaction--had created what to any reasonable observer was not even an illusion of military strength. The idea that any future war would be an unlimited one, with an exchange of nuclear firepower, had led inexorably to the belief that conventional armed forces were not as important as they once had been. Korea had revealed the flaws in this line of reasoning, and the first American fighting men in that conflict had suffered certainly the deadly results of this error. Research and development had been neglected; equipment modernization had been delayed; active military strength had been drawn down below safe levels; and the Army's neglect of its own Organized Reserve Corps' had created not only inequities and injustices, but also deadly inefficiency. The United States finally achieved a sort of peace in Korea, but the fighting men there paid a terrible price for the parsimony and neglect of the post-war years. 14

THE EISENHOWER ERA

During the Eisenhower years (1953-1961), the Army Reserve became stronger primarily through the influence and leadership of Congress. Presumably, President Eisenhower, a distinguished soldier and supporter of the RC, would have taken the lead, but he was overcome by his own fiscal conservatism. He saw the RC cheaper to operate than the active forces. However, Eisenhower also knew when budget cuts were necessary, and the armed forces were the most logical and convenient place to retrench.

Additionally, Eisenhower gave lip-service to improving the readiness of the RC. One specific example was where he failed to authorize more Army Reserve Military Technicians necessary to help reduce the maintenance deficiencies within the reserve units. In 1960, 5,100 technicians were required but only 3,046 were authorized and funded. Was the Army Reserve considered a paper tiger or a formidable fighting force? 15

Fortunately for the RC, Congress legislated both the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 and the Reserves Forces Act of 1955. These laws provided the Reserve officers statutory guarantees of promotion consideration paralleling that of the active Army officers.

BERLIN CRISIS

As President Kennedy initiated some fundamental changes in the American defense policy, he mobilized to active duty more than 60,000 Army Reservists during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Kennedy wanted to shift Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation to a flexible response. Therefore, he directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to reorganize the Defense Department and to improve the neglected national defense. McNamara stated Kennedy's position succinctly in 1961:

In the light of the present world situation, it was essential that (the Army) reserve forces be brought as soon as possible to a state of readiness that would permit them to respond on very short notice to limited war situations which threaten to tax the capacity of the active Army. Moreover, they must be so organized, trained and equipped as to permit their rapid integration into the active Army. 16

McNamara quickly surmised that the RC required restructuring. His reorganization plans met with great resistance from Congress. He established the Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) as it exists today.

For the first time, Reserve requirements were tied directly to contingency plans, and equipment and manning levels were increased for Army Reserve units. The groundwork was thus laid for the "Total Army" concept of the 1970s. 17

The 1961 mobilization was considered a qualified success. Deterrence as a national strategic objective was accomplished primarily because West Berlin was able to retain its democratic agenda. During this period the Army increased its strategic reserve by two combat divisions. 17

But the reorganization caused great turmoil within the Army Reserve. The USAR had changed from the Triangular Division structure to the Pentomic structure and then to the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) structure. At this point in USAR restructuring, two-star ARCOMs were formed to provide command and control of the Army Reserve units. McNamara faced seven years of tough in-fighting with Congress and by the political and powerful Reserve Officers' Association. Both parties were fundamentally opposed to McNamara's reorganization tactics. The turmoil did not settle until 1967, with the elimination of low-priority units from the USAR. Then a better defined national defense role was provided for the USAR. 19

VIETNAM ERA

Even though Vietnam would have provided an ideal situation for McNamara's model, the Reserves were not used except for a token call-up following the Tet Offensive in 1968. Again there appeared to be a lack of clear understanding and guidelines for using the Army Reserve as an expansion base for complete mobilization--as seen in World War II. In fact, President Johnson intended to limit U.S. involvement in Vietnam by not fully mobilizing the RC. 20

But from 1960 to 1969, there were some positive changes to the Army Reserve. Some 4,338 company-sized units with a drill strength of approximately 300,000 reservists were authorized. The strength posture improved significantly, from 55 percent to 90 percent of allocated strength. Units were modernized, and World War II equipment, rifles and trucks were replaced. Major General William J. Sutton was appointed the first statutory Chief, Army Reserve (CAR); he thus became the appropriations director for the Reserve Personnel Army and Military Construction Army Reserve appropriations. As a result, the CAR became the national spokesman for the Army Reserve. In sum, such changes--despite resistance to them--set the stage for the Total Army Concept of the 1970s and 1980s. 21

ENDNOTES

1. Richrd B. Crossland, LTC, USAR, and James T. Currie, MAJ, USAR, Twice The Citizen, p. 37.
2. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
3. Ibid., p. 64.
4. Kriedberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, quoted by Crossland and Currie, pg. 64.
5. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
6. Ibid., p. 65.
7. Ibid., p. 68.
8. James F. Schnabeh and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III-The Korean War, Part 1, p. 45.
9. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, p. 96.
10. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
11. Ibid., p. 99.
12. Ibid., p. 99.
13. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
14. Ibid., p. 102.
15. Ibid., pp. 115-132.
16. Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces-The Problem of the Weekend Warrior, p. 20.
17. Crossland and Currie, pp. 133-134.
18. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
19. Ibid., pp. 149-150.
20. Binkin, pp. 20-21.
21. Crossland and Currie, pp. 182-184.

CHAPTER III

THE ARMY RESERVE TODAY

TOTAL ARMY

The Vietnam War divided the country with riots in the streets; Nixon's Watergate scandal didn't help matters; Carter's faltering administration weakened our country, especially the hostage crisis; and, for the Army Reserve, the reorganization created much turmoil. The U.S. finally resorted to the all-volunteer Army and the Total Army Concept, and the Army Reserve persevered.

During Ronald W. Reagan's eight years as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, his national strategy of deterrence required a strong armed forces. In fact, the importance of the Reserves was reflected in Reagan's national security strategy statement:

Our plans for military manpower mobilization are based upon the Total Force policy, established in the early 1970s, which placed increased responsibilities on the Reserve Component of the U.S. forces. With fully 50 percent of the combat units for land warfare in the Reserve Components, their importance to our conventional deterrent cannot be overstated. Their priority for manning, training and equipment mobilization is based on time-phasing of their use in operational plans. In many cases, the sequence of deployment would place Reserve Component units side by side with, and sometimes even ahead of, the active duty forces. While there are specific mission areas in which the role for Reserve Components can be expanded, we need to exercise care to avoid fundamentally altering the nature of service in the Reserves, or imbalance the reserve/active force mix. ¹

President Reagan improved significantly the Army Reserve. With his increased Defense budget, the Army Reserve was modernized with new equipment, new force structuring and more money for training so it could continue to improve in unit readiness.

General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army similarly observed that "The Army is fully integrated with our society. Only about one-half of the Total Army consists of active forces. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard, stationed throughout the nation, provide forces and capabilities needed in both peace and war." ² He continued on by stating:

Modernization applies also to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard because they are integral elements of our Total Army in deterrence and defense. The Army, therefore, gives the same priority to Reserve and Active Component units that will fight alongside or support each other. This means conversion to modern units designs, a dedicated procurement program to improve readiness and appropriate education and training support. We must continue to maintain a Total Army perspective as we shape future modernization plans. ³

Major General William F. Ward., Jr., Chief, Army Reserve, who has responsibility for the Army Reserve, fully supports the Total Army:

The Army Reserve mission is to organize, train and equip its units, preparing them to help defend our nation with little or no advance notice. As directed by Congress, the Army Reserve is tasked to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in the time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires. ⁴

MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS

Since the revitalization of defense policy in linking both the Active and Reserve Components as a Total Force, the design was to build a stronger force. The primary purpose was to deter war or be ready to fight and win on the battlefield. With this new defense policy, the missions and tasks for the Army Reserve increased rapidly and enormously. This increased reliance on the RC required the Army Reserve to improve their mobilization capabilities, increase their readiness posture, and primarily, to perfect their ability to fight, win and survive on the battlefield. General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command, who is responsible for more than a million AC and RC soldiers, explains that:

A key ingredient to mission accomplishment is improving and maintaining Total Force readiness. The FORSCOM missions--readiness and the maintenance of peace by deterrence of war--all depend on carefully planned and executed training; therefore, training is our highest priority every day of the year. In support of national military strategy, we are preparing battalion and brigade task forces, divisions and corps to fight and win against numerically superior enemies. ⁵

General Palastra and other Army leaders indicate that the real key to readiness is time. If the Army Reserve is required to mobilize, deploy and fight alongside active forces--or in some cases, deploy prior to the active forces--then the Army Reserve will require more time to train. Training to meet the standards is not always an easily attainable objective.

Part-time Army Reserve commanders are increasingly burdened with added responsibilities of new dimensions:

- o Realignment of Capstone of all Army Reserve units with AC units. In some cases, this requires new coordination and training to meet the commander's objectives and tasks.
- o Reorganization and modernization of units, which presents many new challenges in force structure, equipment, and manning.
- o Earlier mobilization and deployment times, in which case increases stress and pressure on the reservists.
- o Increased Overseas Training Deployment exercises, which require a tremendous amount of time for detailed planning.
- o New high-tech equipment, which demands more training time. 6

Further, other basic individual and collective training requirements demand much time: weapons firing, military occupation specialist training, annual training, command inspections, and others. Also, the administration workload required through the bureaucracy poses an ongoing dilemma for the reservists. Reserve commanders undoubtedly need help from the mix of FTS personnel to meet their increasing administrative, readiness, and training responsibilities. How much support in FTS personnel resources should be allotted to the commanders for orchestrating their units?

FULL-TIME SUPPORT FORCE

According to MG Ward:

While making up 24 percent of the Total Army structure, the Army Reserve absorbs slightly more than four percent of the Army budget, providing a cost-effective answer to the Army's needs for units to meet mission requirements. The Army Reserve's FTS personnel is a 'force multiplier' that enables drilling Reservists to take maximum advantage of the limited training time available to them. They also make it possible for the Army Reserve to sustain the readiness levels it needs to accomplish its increasing missions. The growth of this force is a cost effective alternative to maintaining a large standing Army. The members of the FTS force-Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers, Active Component (AC) soldiers, Army Reserve technicians (ART), and Department of the Army (DAC) civilians-augment Army Reserve units on a full-time basis and perform the myriad administrative, recruiting, planning, maintenance, supply, and training functions essential to unit readiness.

ARMY RESERVE TECHNICIAN

The make-up of the FTS force began with the Army Reserve Technician program, established in 1950. The purpose of the ART program was for the technicians to carry out essential functions between weekday and weekend training assemblies. The ART program did not grow significantly in the first decade. But by 1971, 6,400 technicians were authorized. In a 24 May 1978, memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics John P. White asserted that "the Army Reserve had the least effective full time force of any RC." ⁸ In fact, the Army Reserve had the least number of technicians--only four percent of the USAR strength, while the Air Force had twenty-two percent full-time technical personnel. White then criticized

the management of the technician program and strongly recommended that the FTS for the Army Reserve be increased to help readiness. 9

Since the dual status requirement was established in 1970, many changes in the program have affected the civilian employee. Basically, a technician must maintain a Reserve membership as a condition of employment. Therefore, if an ART lost his Reserve status, he was placed in a non-technician civil service position. Customarily, dual status was created so the technician would be a mobilization asset and help ease the unit through its transition to active duty. The greatest and most disturbing flaw in this system was that if the technician lost his Selected Reserve status through retirement with 20 years of qualifying service or denial of continued military status because of medical disqualification, he remained employed as a civil service employee. By 1978, 20 percent of the ARTs had lost their dual status through no fault of their own; they were no longer mobilization assets. These ARTs were then referred as "status quo" technicians. The fact that the status quo technician was no longer deployable drew a great deal of fire from both reservists and Congressmen.

Crossland and Currie explained that:

In June 1978, the House Armed Services Committee asked the Army to begin a 15-month "Technician Conversion Test" to see if it was desirable to phase out the Army Reserve's civilian technician program. During the test, which ended in June, 1980, the Army Reserve brought 1,276 Army Reservists on active duty in an Active Guard-Reserve (AGR) status to fill vacant civilian technician positions. In December 1980, even though the conversion test caused considerable distress among the civilian force, the Army concluded that conversions should continue through

attrition and that nearly 3,000 more positions should be converted to AGR status in the next few years. As a result of the discontentment, however, the conversion program was slowed considerably. By the end of the 1982 fiscal year, only 1,540 civilian positions had been converted to AGR status, and action on the 1983 Defense Budget restricted further conversion. Specifically, the House Appropriations Committee objected to FORSCOM plans to convert the 43 Senior Staff Administrative Assistant (SSAA) positions to full-time colonel positions; and that same committee insured that the continuing resolution which funded the Defense Department for 1983 contained language prohibiting the SSAA conversion. It also limited the total number of converted positions to the number already converted. This put a temporary halt to Army plans to phase out civilian technicians. 10

ACTIVE GUARD-RESERVE

Even so, Congress did not stop the expansion of the FTS force. In fact, they allowed for increasing the force under the AGR program. The primary considerations for implementing the AGR program were:

- o Recruit sufficient Army Reserve manpower. The Army reliance on the USAR demanded fully trained, disciplined soldiers. In an era of declining manpower resources, recruiting new members became critical. Unit commanders were tasked to conduct their own recruiting program, which distracted from their primary mission--maintaining the state of readiness. As a result, Congress resolved that reserve recruiting should be a full-time job, thus requiring full-time employees.

- o Increase the readiness of the Army Reserve. In 1975, a "Total Force Study" identified three major areas for improvement within the Reserves: Mobilization planning; unit equipment; and, integration of active and reserve forces. This implied that the Reserve required better training, organizing, and administering to attain a disciplined force. Therefore, more FTS personnel were needed to help meet these goals.
- o Solve problems associated with the ARTs. The primary FTS was the military technician. Because of the problems and criticisms of the ART program, the AGR program seemed a better option. Adding fuel to the fire, the unionization of the ART was resisted by the bureaucrats causing some disfavor. Actually, this probably led to creation of the new AGR program.
- o Insure proper military classification. The AC could not supply the type of soldiers needed in the FTS area because of 'statutory tours' under the United States Code for AC personnel. Therefore, only in 1978 did the House and Senate conferees considering the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1979 agree that a new program was needed to support the Army Reserve. 11

Through the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1979, Congress approved an increase in authorizing active-duty end-strength of

the Army. The increase exceeded the Administration's requirement for 2,000 of the 4,100 Reserve recruiters then serving active duty training tours. But there's an interesting story behind this appropriation:

By including half of these people in this year's authorization, the conferees provided for a transition from this status of 'active duty for training' to a new status of active duty for organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserves. The conferees agreed that a legislative proposal be considered at the earliest possible date to create authority for this new category. ¹²

Hence, the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1980 included a new category, the AGR program, enabling the reservist to serve on active duty for the "purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the RC. ¹³ As a result, a new military status called the Active Guard-Reserve was created.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIANS

Civil service employees who support the Army Reserve play an important part in meeting the full-time support mission. They provide approximately one-fifth of the total FTS force. The DACs provide clerical and administrative support at all levels, and they have no obligation for membership in the Reserves. ¹⁴

ACTIVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS

AC soldiers who support the USAR bring with them technical expertise vital to the reservists in preparation for mobilization. These AC personnel have current experiences on new equipment and the latest operational doctrine and training techniques. 15

With the reduction of the AC end-strength, the Army has slowly reduced the number of personnel assigned to the Army Reserve. At one time, over 1,300 soldiers were assigned to key support reserve positions, but currently only 1,191 soldiers fill these billets. Further reduction of the AC soldiers will send the wrong signal to the Army Reserve, causing them to believe that AC is taking their support responsibilities too mildly. Furthermore, the reduction will have a serious impact on training readiness within the TPUs. ACs have become an integral part of the USAR family. And when a member of that family leaves, the whole family feels the loss. Experienced AC soldiers bring new, fresh ideas to the Army Reserve commands; they have always enhanced the unit's mobilization readiness. Clausewitz philosophizes eloquently on the value of experienced soldiers:

As the human eye in a dark room dilates its pupil, draws in the little light that there is, partially distinguishes objects by degrees, and at last knows them quite well, so it is in war with the experienced soldier, whilst the novice is only met by pitch dark night. 16

The Army Reserves need experienced soldiers assigned to the TPUs, so that their valued years of experience will stimulate and enlighten the reservists.

RESERVE COMMANDER'S DILEMMA

Reserve commands are manned with a mix of part-time and FTS personnel. However, most members are drilling reservists who participate on a part-time basis; they spend about 350 hours a year in maintaining their military proficiency. Most available time is dedicated to mission-type preparation. We have already noted that time is a critical element.

Competition for the reservists's time is graphically portrayed in figure 1: 17

THE UNIT TRAINING TIME SQUEEZE




FIGURE 1

Now if we continue to modernize the force and assume more new missions adding to this time squeeze, as claimed by MG Ward, additional time must be allotted. ¹⁸ But what should we eliminate?

Rather, we must ask how to reduce the Army Reserve commander's administrative workload. It seems impossible to reduce the paperwork and the peripheral administration inherent to a military organization. Colonel John Topper, USAR Advisor to FORSCOM, stated:

The average USAR company commander spends far too much of his time dealing with administrative detail that contributes little toward improving the combat readiness of his unit. This situation is intolerable in today's Army that is reliant on the Reserve as never before. Much of the Army's combat support and combat service support is concentrated in the Reserve and many of these units are only marginally combat ready. Some are elements of the M+10 Essential Force, intended to deploy rapidly to Europe on short notice to reinforce NATO should the need arise. This gives them a higher priority within the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL); they are being filled with new equipment, and they are receiving enhanced recruiting support. They are also getting a lot of guidance from wartime gaining commands as well as peacetime commands. Unfortunately, this added support increases their administrative requirements at a time when the opposite is needed. They should be concentrating on the two primary functions critical to mobilization readiness: Training toward attaining proficiency in their wartime missions and maintaining their assigned equipment necessary to the successful accomplishment of that mission. ¹⁹

What does the Army Reserve commander need? The bottom line is to get more help with more full-time personnel. He needs the FTS personnel to assist him in command and control, supervisory, supply, maintenance, personnel, administration, operations, mobilization planning, and training. How many FTS personnel should be assigned to his unit? This depends

entirely on several variables: Type of unit, mission, unit strength, number of tasks, diversification of functions, deployment priority of unit, force modernization, Capstone alignment, high technology, and finally, location of the unit in relation to the parent headquarters.

In addition, the company commander needs to have the majority of the administrative workload pulled from his headquarters. Where should the administrative nightmare be located? It should be at a command support center.

COMMAND SUPPORT CENTER CONCEPT

The Command Support Center (CSC) Concept merged from a 1985 FORSCOM initiative. FORSCOM proposed removing all the ARTs from the TPUs and consolidating them in center support teams at the reserve centers. This concept would supersede the Consolidation of Administration at Battalion level (CABL) and the Consolidation of Military Personnel Activities (COMPACT). However, both programs are still employed by some reserve units to reduce some of the administrative burden to the commander, though only with limited success.

FORSCOM is looking for a program that will help reduce the commander's administrative overload. Thus FORSCOM thinks the CSC, employed correctly and effectively, will significantly reduce the administrative workload. Its plan to consolidate the manpower assets under this concept is a logical answer.

In an interview, Mr. William D. Clark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower Reserve Affairs, stated that "the CSC concept will be an avenue for the FTS force to provide the similar services to the drilling reservists as the active installations provide to the active soldiers." 20

FORSCOM has selected the 63rd ARCOM (California), 83rd ARCOM (Ohio), 89th ARCOM (Kansas), and the 90th ARCOM (Texas) to field test this concept, after FORSCOM receives Congressional approval.

In his FY 89 posture Statement, General Ward stated that:

The key to providing this support is automation-the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS), which will expedite the flow of information and reports necessary for the daily functioning and administration as well as the mobilizing of Army Reserve units.

The alignment of the Army Reserve unit functions into sustaining, operations, and training command lines will cause a realignment of the full-time support force. It is likely that AGR soldiers in units will assist with operational planning and training, while that Army Reserve technician force will perform administrative, logical, and other functions normally associated with sustainment operations. 21

But automation is only a part of the answer. Surely it will help streamline some of the systems. But the bottom line is for the CSC concept to reduce the administrative workload for the company commanders. This concept, employed intelligently, will enhance mobilization preparedness. In fact, between 1980 to 1983, I enjoyed some success employing the CABL and COMPACT systems, while I commanded a reserve engineer battalion (combat, heavy) in the Pacific, with units located on the islands of Oahu, Maui, Hawaii, and Guam.

FTS TASK FORCE

Army Reserve strength currently projects 601,000 personnel. The Selected Reserve consists of 307,500 paid strength soldiers and 13,100 Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) personnel; besides, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) consists of 287,500 on-call soldiers. 22

FTS force is responsible for providing solely needed full-time support in order to maintain the force of 600,000. The most current FTS personnel figures provided by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve indicate:

- o AGR - 13,344
- o ART - 7,529
- o DAC - 5,528
- o AC - 1,191

TOTAL - 27,592 Personnel

But what FTS force percentage of the Selected Reserve end-strength would it take to meet the needs of all the assigned missions? In separate interviews with both Mr. Clark and MG Ward, they responded to the question with "14 percent." How did they arrive at 14 percent as a hard percentage? Congress decided on that percentage so the Army Reserve FTS force could someday match the other RC services. However, the Army Reserve is currently at 8.6 percent of its Selected Reserve end-strength. To acquire 14 percent (43,890 personnel) it calls for 16,298 additional manpower. Can the Defense budget afford such a large increase? So, can the USAR continue

to accept new missions from the active Army without an increase? Otherwise, why should the other RC services be staffed with FTS at higher levels?

Review of the figures provided below, indicates that the USAR is lagging significantly behind the rest of the RC, with one exception: 23

<u>Service</u>	<u>Paid Strength</u>	<u>FTS</u>	<u>Percent</u>
ARNG	451858	51925	12%
ANG	114595	32318	28%
USNR	148096	28336	19%
USMCR	42253	6910	16%
USAFR	80415	14434	18%
USCGR	13287	702	5%
USAR	320600	27592	8.6%

Why is the USAR lagging behind? Historically, the Army Reserve has always been in the rear of the other services. For example, the Chief, Army Reserve is authorized a Major General and without any command authority. On the other hand, Chief, National Guard Bureau is a three-star billet, and the Navy and Air Force both have command authority over their forces. So why isn't Congress providing equally among all of the RC services? Many more examples could be cited, but my Chapter II scenario fairly well outlines this USAR thesis that the Army Reserve is lagging behind the other RC services.

Army Regulation 135-2 (DRAFT) states that:

The objective of the FTS program is to improve Reserve Component (RC) readiness and mobilization/ deployment planning and preparation by providing:

- a. AGR, AC, and Federal Civil Service personnel to RC units and organizations.
- b. AGR personnel to Active Component organizations in support of RC missions. ²⁴

To meet this objective, continued emphasis must be placed on increasing the FTS force. The Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Headquarters, Department of the Army, has staff proponency for this regulation, and provides Congress with FTS force requirement levels within the current program objective memorandum (POM). However, Congress has basically stopped all future growth. For the next three years, there will be no Active Guard-Reserve plus-up. However, the Army Reserve Technicians will be increased by 200. The Department of the Army Civilians will take a cut of 1021. Therefore, the FTS force will decline by 821. So, on one hand, Congress directed that the USAR should reach 14 percent, but on the other hand, they will not provide necessary funding to accomplish it.

In reply to a questionnaire (see Appendix 1), Colonel William D. Hyde, Director, AGR Management, feels that:

The Army Reserve has made great strides in preparing the reserve units for mobilization; and, the assigned FTS personnel has significantly aided in this effort. However, we are still short in the number of FTS personnel we need if we are to achieve the readiness levels required. Our current models identify 23,000 plus (AGR) requirements for just existing units and there is no way we will ever reach the 14 percent manning level that Congress directed we attain with projected growth. ²⁵

Today's national strategy includes the Army Reserve as an integral part of the Army's available combat potential. The next war will be come-as-you-are, allowing very little

preparation at post-mobilization. USAR is no longer considered as a follow-up force, as it once was. Today, the Army Reserve will deploy alongside and sometimes ahead of the AC. The Army Reserve has 12 percent of the units within the M+10 Essential Force.

Most importantly, this force will deploy to Europe within 30 days to reinforce NATO if war breaks out. In fact, the Army Reserve has a large percentage of the logistic units that may deploy well before some of the 28 combat divisions.

The Army Reserve contributes greatly to the overall Army wartime structure as a part of the integrated force. The USAR has 2 percent combat divisions, 17 percent non-division combat, 40 percent tactical support, 17 percent theater forces, and 23 percent general support. To show the importance of the Army Reserves' role, the following list is provided with types of units that consist of more than 50 percent Army Reserve units: 26

o	Pathfinder detachments/teams	55%
o	Chemical groups/battalions	91%
o	Smoke Generator companies	78%
o	Army hospitals	62%
o	Conventional Ammo companies	51%
o	Special Ammo companies	100%
o	Petroleum (POL) Command and Control groups/battalions	59%
o	POL Supply companies	67%
o	POL Laboratory detachments	50%

o	Graves Registration battalion	100%
o	Airdrop Supply companies	67%
o	Airdrop equipment companies	76%
o	Personnel and Administration battalion	76%
o	Personnel Service companies	56%
o	Military Police (MP) units	76%
o	MP Confinement detachments	90%
o	MP Criminal Investigative detachments	76%
o	Supply and Services companies	59%
o	Corps Support Group Headquarters companies	62%
o	Field Depot headquarters companies	86%
o	Terminal Service and Transfer companies	61%
o	Railroad units	100%
o	Training Divisions	100%
o	Civil Affairs commands	97%
o	Psychological Operations units	89%
o	Judge Advocate General detachments	98%
o	Military Intelligence companies	71%
o	Strategic R-A detachments	100%

As described, the Army Reserve has the bulk of the combat support and combat service support units, however, these units are ill-equipped and manned with many trained personnel. This point is very important because of the issue of sustainability on the battlefield. The wartime priority shifting of major

support roles to the USAR has significantly increased the responsibilities for mobilization preparedness at both individual and unit readiness. In fact, the demands have grown dramatically (see Fig. 1). The need for technically trained soldiers is rapidly increasing; however, their civilian careers, family, continuing education, and other community obligations are not diminishing. The citizen-soldier can give up only so much of his day for Army Reserve business. For these reasons, authorizing adequate levels of FTS manning is critically important. 27

ENDNOTES

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3. Ibid., p. 30.
4. William F. Ward., Jr., Major General, Chief, Army Reserve, "Building over; Reserve's Focus is on Fine-Tuning," Army Magazine, pp. 112-113.
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6. Roger C. Bultman, LTC(P), Full-time Personnel...When Do We Need Them And What Should They Yield?, pp. 1-2.
7. Ward, p. 112 and p. 118.
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9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Crossland and Currie, pp. 219-220.
11. Thomas F. England, Major, "The Active Guard/Reserve Program: A New Military Personnel Status," Military Law Review, pp. 7-10.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. Ibid., p. 11.

14. Stephen M. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, p. 42.

15. Ibid., p. 41.

16. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 167.

17. Duncan, p. 41.

18. Interview with William F. Ward, Jr., MG, Chief, Army Reserve, St. Louis, Missouri, 7 November 1988.

19. John A. Topper, Col, "Paperwork War Stymies Commanders," The Officer, pp. 13-14.

20. Interview with Mr. William D. Clark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower Reserve Affairs, Pentagon, Washington, 9 December 1988.

21. William F. Ward, Jr., Major General, Chief, Army Reserve, Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve FY89, p. 21.

22. Ibid., p. 21.

23. Duncan, pp. 42 and 47.

24. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 135-2 (Draft), p. 9.

25. Questionnaire from William D. Hyde, Colonel, Director, AGR Management, St. Louis, 7 November 1988.

26. Ward, pp. D3-D20.

27. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the first three chapters, we examined the issues affecting the Army Reserve FTS force and observed the major role the FTS force plays in assisting the USAR commanders improvement of the Army Reserve troop program units' mobilization readiness. The following conclusions and recommendations urge Congress to rethink their decision not to approve a FTS manpower increase for the next three years.

CONGRESS APPROPRIATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Should Congress be more responsive in authorizing a manpower increase of FTS personnel for the Army Reserve? Historically, Congress has been a friend of the Army Reserve. In some cases, past Presidential Administrations have not provided the necessary support to maintain a strong, combat-ready Army Reserve. But the issue obviously is not whether Congress is a friend. Rather, the problem is whether Congress truly understands the impact of their decision not to provide the Army Reserve with a FTS manpower increase.

During the lean years following World War I prior to World War II, the United States intended to maintain a small regular Army with a large reserve force. This intention was good. But the country was not prepared to support a modest

military program. Consequently, World War II found the Reserves deficient in many areas, primarily due to the lack of dollars directed to force structuring and modernization. Following WWII, similar budgetary problems arose, causing greater disturbance within the RC. Moreover, the full energy of Truman's Administration was not exerted to provide the Army Reserve with necessary modernization. So during the Korean Conflict, the Army Reserve suffered from severe defects, largely stemming from the minimal military expenditures. Following Truman, President Eisenhower felt the cheapest way to maintain a strong military force was through the Reserves. But he was overcome by his own fiscal conservatism. Eisenhower was short-sighted when he did not provide for a plus-up of the Military Technicians for the USAR units to help improve unit readiness.

However, President Kennedy initiated some fundamental changes in the American defense policy, moving from Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation to a flexible response. During this period, the Army Reserve experienced many structural changes which enhanced mobilization preparedness. The mobilization of Reserves for the 1961 Berlin Crisis was considered a qualified success--almost a precedent. McNamara's model for the Reserves sought to improve the mobilization readiness; even so, there were many problems inherent with the model of restructuring the Reserves.

With the recent Reagan Administration, the Army Reserve really prospered. President Reagan, Mr. Weinberger, then the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Army significantly improved the USAR through a larger DOD budget. It provided for modernization, force structure, new training programs, and construction of new reserve centers and training sites. Most importantly, it increased the FTS manpower. On one hand, President Reagan visualized the high cost to preserve peace with a strong combat-ready military force; and on the other hand, he knew the bottom line was that the RC must receive a fair share of the Total Army missions at a cheaper outlay of dollars.

The 1989 DOD budget was approved at a staggering amount of \$300 billion because the Soviet threat still exists. With the Army plan, the Army Reserve has been tasked to increase the AGR force to 19,000 by 1994 to improve the mobilization readiness. Also, Congress has gone on record stating that the USAR FTS force should be at 14 percent of the Selected Reserve end-strength. Finally, mobilization preparedness with the help of the FTS force still requires serious attention.

So why is Congress reducing the FTS force by 826 personnel for the next three years? And why is the AC reducing their assigned soldiers in support of the USAR? The reduction will keep the FTS force at a negative six percent. How can Congress expect the Army Reserve to maintain their units at the same levels of training readiness as the AC?

The Army Reserve makes up 24 percent of the Total Army structure, yet it spends only four percent of the Army's budget. This is a real deal! Given these facts, why is Congress micro-managing the Reserves while not supporting the Secretary of the Army funding appropriate levels of FTS manning to meet the 14 percent Congressional objective?

Congress directed the Army Reserve to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in the time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires. Surely Congress realizes that the Army has given the Army Reserve additional missions with an understanding of extensive growth in the FTS force. During the last eight years, the FTS force has grown significantly. But as in 1980, the force is still the lowest within the RCs.

In 1988 alone, the USAR needed 2,000 additional AGR soldiers just to man the new units and to support the planned force modernization. Was this accomplished? No. The resources simply were not made available. For example, the Army Reserve could not bring on line an aviation unit without the FTS staff providing maintenance for the aircrafts. In addition, who will provide the operation and training support needed to maintain this technical type unit? It is rather impossible to conduct daily business unless FORSCOM redirects their available assets from current TPUs. But even that would only compound the problem.

Besides these issues, the number of Congressmen with military experience are quickly diminishing. Less than 50 percent have served in the military. Even fewer have served in the RC. So how can one expect these Congressmen to understand the drilling reservist's dilemma. The reservists must maintain a civilian career and also contribute fully to the Army Reserve.

The reservist must maintain a military skill gained through formal and informal military schools and training. For officers, the many years of night classes and summer training for continuing military education, advanced courses to Command and General Staff College are mandatory for promotion. Even enlisted personnel face a series of courses for their promotions. How can Congressmen appreciate the long hours reservists spend at the reserve centers--hours lost forever to their families? How can they understand that the reservists suffer from a lack of employer support? Does the employer consider a reservist an asset when he may be called-up at a moment's notice? Moreover, does Congress really understand the unit training time squeeze described in Chapter III. Basically, Congress needs to understand the Army Reserve commander's situation. Congress should comprehend the consequences of not providing the manpower resources necessary to improve the mobilization readiness.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Congress should approve the manpower funding appropriations necessary to increase Army Reserve FTS force to 14 percent of the Selected Reserve end-strength. Today, 14 percent represents nearly 44,000 FTS personnel; the FTS force is currently at 27,592 strong.

The FTS force is an integral part of USAR readiness; FTS personnel act as a favorable "force multiplier." The programmed reduction in funding for the next three years will seriously impair the country's mobilization readiness and capabilities. Congress' failure to fully appropriate the FTS program will cause a loss of missed opportunities to improve the Army Reserve training. Most importantly, mobilization readiness will decline.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT FORCE MIX

CONCLUSIONS

I have shown why Congress should increase the FTS force. However, what appropriate FTS personnel mix consisting of AGRs, ARTs, DACs, and AC soldiers should Congress approve? Some argue for increasing AGR, but others call for more ARTs. Since the DOD Authorization Act of 1980, the AGR program has grown rapidly, primarily to enhance reserve manpower recruiting, to increase reserve readiness, to solve problems associated with the ART program, and to insure proper military classification. On the other hand, the ART program was officially established

in 1950 to carry out essential functions between weekday and weekend training assemblies. However, the program has been criticized for a lack of good management. Many of its problems developed because the ART program is not managed by a sole agency or office, whereas the AGR program is managed by Army Reserve Personnel Center, AGR Directorate.

Further, we should consider the 1985 FORSCOM's initiative, the Command Support Center Concept. A few weeks ago, Congress disapproved the concept for field-testing. Is Congress again micro-managing the Army Reserve? CSC concept would reduce the administrative workload by consolidating the resources at the reserve centers. Realigning the ARTs would place many of the technicians where they could better serve and support the TPUs. In addition, the new automation program would be best employed under this concept.

The Department of the Army DCSOPS is proponent for FTS force; he provided Congress with force requirements levels for the years in question. The increased levels projected a greater AGR mix. The current model identified 23,000 plus AGR requirements, just for existing units. This would add about 10,000 new AGR soldiers to the existing force. The balance of approximately 6,000 more FTS personnel should be appropriated to the ART.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Congress should approve the DA DCSOPS FTS force model. Additionally, that Congress stops micro-managing the Army Reserve. The bottom line is to increase FTS personnel so the Army Reserve will continue to improve TPU readiness.

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

Proposed title: Full time support force for the USAR--Why should we continue to increase the force?

Subject description: FTUS personnel are provided to support the Reserve unit commanders in pre-mobilization, mobilization and post-mobilization readiness requirements. Proper utilization and employment of these full time assets are critical for reserve units to properly prepare for combat upon mobilization.

1. In your opinion, what is the role and responsibility of the FTUS personnel?

2. Do we have the right mix of Military Technicians (MT), Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), and Active Component personnel assigned to the USAR?

3. Do you feel the current utilization and employment of the FTUS force is effective to meet the USAR needs? In not, why?

4. Do you think that the Command Support Center concept will better serve the unit commander? If yes, why?

5. In your opinion, do you think the U.S. Forces Command is actively and effectively employing and managing the FTUS personnel force?

6. Are we making progress in preparing the reserve units for mobilization? If yes, are the assigned FTUS personnel aiding in this effort?

7. Should we continue to increase the FTUS personnel force? If yes, can you recommend how much of an increase and the appropriate mix of the four personnel groups?